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Abstract—The Unshared Secret Key Cryptography (USK), re-
cently proposed by the authors, guarantees Shannon’s ideal
secrecy and perfect secrecy for MIMO wiretap channels, without
requiring secret key exchange. However, the requirement of
infinite constellation inputs limits its applicability to practical
systems. In this paper, we propose a practical USK scheme
using finite constellation inputs. The new scheme is based on a
cooperative jamming technique, and is valid for the case where the
eavesdropper has more antennas than the transmitter. We show
that Shannon’s ideal secrecy can be achieved with an arbitrarily
small outage probability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Symmetric-key cryptography (e.g. AES [1]) has tradition-
ally been the major technology for providing a secure gateway
for communication and data exchanges at the network layer.
One weakness of this approach is that the transmitter (Alice)
and the legitimate receiver (Bob) must trust some secure
communications channel to transmit the secret key, and there
may be a chance that others (Eve) can discover the secret
key during transmission. Physical layer security (PLS) is an
alternative way of providing non-key based security solutions
[2]. The PLS approaches leverage state-of-the art channel
coding (e.g. polar codes [3]) to enhance security at the physical
layer. The general problem of PLS is the requirement of an
infinite-length wiretap code to approach the secrecy capacity
[4]. This limits the applicability of these schemes to practical
communication systems.
Our previous work [5]–[7] has shown that it is possible to
protect the confidential message without requiring either secret
key exchange or wiretap codes. In particular, we proposed the
Unshared Secret Key Cryptography (USK) to comply with
two security goals: (i) the secret key is not needed by Bob
to decipher, (ii) the secret key is fully affecting Eve’s ability
to decipher the ciphertext. Although those two goals seem to
contradict each other, this can be reconciled by aligning a one-
time pad (OTP) secret key within the null space of a MIMO
channel between Alice and Bob. In this way, the OTP nulls out
at Bob, but adds a certain degree of uncertainty to the received
signal at Eve. The USK is rooted in the artificial noise (AN)
technique [8], and has been shown to achieve Shannon’s ideal
secrecy and perfect secrecy [7]. An interesting case is ideal
secrecy: an encryption algorithm is ideally secure if no matter
how much of ciphertext is intercepted by Eve, there is no
unique solution of the plaintext but many solutions of compa-
rable probability [9]. An ideal cryptosystem has information-
theoretic security (i.e., cryptanalytically unbreakable), but not
Shannon’s perfect secrecy (i.e., plaintext and ciphertext are
mutually independent) [9].
The original USK scheme [7] may be regarded as being of
theoretical interest only, since it bases on two assumptions: (i)
infinite lattice constellation input, (ii) Alice has more antennas
than Eve. The first assumption is used to prove the ideal
secrecy, and the second assumption ensures that Eve cannot
run zero-forcing (ZF) attack to remove the OTP [10]. In this
work, we remove these assumptions and show how the idea
of USK can be applied to practical systems. We put forward
a new security model and measure:
1) Finite constellation inputs: we use finite input alphabets
based on QAM signalling.
2) Cooperative jammers: the OTP is generated from the
third-party jammers. This renders the USK viable for the
cases where Eve has more antennas than Alice.
3) Ideal secrecy outage: we show that Shannon’s ideal
secrecy can be achieved for finite constellation input with
an arbitrarily small outage probability.
Section II presents the system model. Section III describes
the USK cryptosystem with finite constellation input. Section
IV analyzes the security of the USK cryptosystem. Section
V sets out the theoretical and practical conclusions. The
Appendix contains the proofs of the theorems.
Notation: Matrices and column vectors are denoted by upper
and lowercase boldface letters, and the Hermitian transpose,
inverse, pseudo-inverse of a matrix B by BH , B−1, and B†,
respectively. We use the standard asymptotic notation f (x) =
O (g (x)) when lim sup
x→∞
|f(x)/g(x)| < ∞. The real, complex,
integer, and complex integer numbers are denoted by R, C, Z,
and Z [i], respectively. H(·), H(·|·), and I(·; ·) represent entropy,
conditional entropy, and mutual information, respectively.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Cooperative Jamming
The security model is based on our recently proposed
MIMO cooperative jamming scheme using artificial noise [11].
This model is quite different from the conventional cooperative
jamming scheme (multiuser jammers over AWGN channels)
in [12]. The detailed differences can be referred to [11].
In our setting, we consider a MIMO wiretap system model
that includes a transmitter (Alice), a legitimate receiver (Bob),
and a passive eavesdropper (Eve), with NA, NB, and NE an-
tennas, respectively. Additionally, a set of N friendly jammers
{Ji}N1 are used to protect against eavesdropping, where each
one has NJ,i antennas, respectively. We assume that NB ≥ NA
and NJ,i > NB. Let
NJ =
N∑
i=1
NJ,i, (1)
be the total number of antennas among all the jammers.
Alice sends a information vector u, which is uniformly
selected from a M-QAM constellation QNA , where ℜ(Q) =
ℑ(Q) = {0, 1, ...,√M − 1}. For simplicity, we ignore the
shifting and scaling operations at Alice to minimize the
transmit power.
Let the matrices
{
HJB,i ∈ CNB×NJ,i
}N
1
represent the chan-
nels from Ji to Bob, for 1 ≤ i ≤ N . Suppose that Ji knows
HJB,i, using the AN scheme [8], the ith jammer transmits
xJ,i = Zivi, (2)
where Zi = null(HJB,i) ∈ CNJ,i×(NJ,i−NB) represents an
orthonormal basis of the null space of HJB,i, i.e., HJB,iZi =
0NB×(NJ,i−NB). Each Ji randomly and independently (without
any predefined distribution) chooses a vector vi ∈ CNJ,i−NB .
We set a peak jamming power constraint PJ, i.e.,
PJ ≥
N∑
i=1
||xJ,i||2 =
N∑
i=1
||vi||2. (3)
The signals received by Bob and Eve are given by
z = Hu+
N∑
i=1
HJB,ixJ,i + nB = Hu+ nB, (4)
y = Gu+
N∑
i=1
HJE,ixJ,i + nE = Gu+ HˆJEZˆvˆ + nE, (5)
where HˆJE = [HJE,1, ... , HJE,N ], Zˆ = diag({Zi}N1 ), and vˆ =
[vT1 , ... , v
T
N ]
T
.
The matrices H ∈ CNB×NA ,G ∈ CNE×NA represent the
channel from Alice to Bob and Alice to Eve, respectively,
while HJE,i ∈ CNE×NJ,i is the channel from jammer Ji to Eve.
All channel matrices are assumed to be mutually independent
(i.e., all terminals are not co-located) and have i.i.d. entries
∼ NC(0, 1). Except for Eve, no one knows G and HˆJE. We
assume that nB and nE are white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
vectors at Bob and Eve, respectively, with i.i.d. entries ∼ NC(0,
σ2B) and NC(0, σ2E).
Remark 1: The vector vˆ is independently generated by
jammers, but not needed by Bob to decipher, while it is fully
affecting Eve’s ability to decipher the original message u. This
enables us to interpret vˆ as an unshared OTP.
B. Channel Assumptions
We consider the worst-case scenario for Alice and Bob:
• Alice does not know any channel matrix.
• Bob only knows H.
• The ith jammer Ji only knows HJB,i, for all i.
• Eve has perfect knowledge of all channel matrices.
• No upper bound on NE or Eve’s SNR.
We focus on information-theoretic security, hence, our
analysis will concentrate on Eve’s equivocation H(u|y). For
simplicity, we further assume that Eve’s channel is noiseless:
y = Gu+ HˆJEZˆvˆ. (6)
Using Data Processing Inequality, it is simple to show that
Eve’s channel noise can only increase her equivocation:
H(u|Gu+ HˆJEZˆvˆ) ≤ H(u|Gu+ HˆJEZˆvˆ + nE).
Moreover, we assume that
NE <
N∑
i=1
NJ,i = NJ, (7)
That requirement ensures that Eve cannot remove the OTP vˆ
by running ZF equalization. To see this, we first let
HˆJB = [HJB,1, ... ,HJB,N ]. (8)
If NE ≥ NJ, HˆJE has a left inverse, denoted by Hˆ†JE, then
the term HˆJEZˆvˆ in (6) can be removed by multiplying y by
W = HˆJBHˆ
†
JE, i.e.,
Wy = WGu+HˆJBZˆvˆ = WGu. (9)
Note that if NE < NJ, this operation is not possible.
Remark 2: The cooperative jamming approach allows us to
replace the constraint NE < NA in the original USK scheme [7]
by NE < NJ, which is much easier to accomplish by increasing
the number of jammers.
C. Shannon’s Ideal Secrecy
We consider a cryptosystem where a sequence of K mes-
sages {mi}K1 are enciphered into the cryptograms {yi}K1 using
a sequence of secret keys {ki}K1 . We assume that {mi}K1 and
{ki}K1 are mutually independent. Let Li be the space size of
ki. Shannon introduced the concept of ideal secrecy in [9] as:
“No matter how much material is intercepted, there is not a
unique solution but many of comparable probability.” In this
work, we give a formal definition of ideal secrecy.
Definition 1: A secrecy system is ideal when
Pr(mi| {yi}K1 ) = Pr
{
mi|yi
}
= 1/Li, for all i. (10)
Remark 3: In terms of Eve’s equivocation, using the en-
tropy chain rule, ideal secrecy is achieved when
H({mi}K1 | {yi}K1 ) =
K∑
i=1
H(mi|yi) =
K∑
i=1
logLi, (11)
where Li ≥ 2 for all i. This condition will be used as our
design criterion for ideal secrecy.
D. Lattice Preliminaries
To describe our scheme, it is convenient to introduce some
lattice preliminaries. An n-dimensional complex lattice ΛC in
a complex space Cm (n ≤ m) is the discrete set defined by:
ΛC =
{
Bu: u ∈ Z [i]n} ,
where the basis matrix B = [b1 · · ·bn] has linearly independent
columns.
ΛC can also be easily represented as 2n-dimensional real
lattice ΛR [13]. In what follows, we introduce some lattice
parameters of ΛC, which have a corresponding value for ΛR.
The Voronoi region of ΛC, defined by
Vi (ΛC) =
{
y ∈ Cm: ‖y − xi‖ ≤ ‖y − xj‖, ∀ xi 6= xj
}
,
gives the nearest neighbor decoding region of lattice point xi.
The volume of any Vi (ΛC), defined as vol(ΛC) , |det(BHB)|,
is equivalent to the volume of the corresponding real lattice.
The effective radius of ΛC, denoted by reff(ΛC), is the radius
of a sphere of volume vol(ΛC) [14]. For large n, it is approx-
imately
reff(ΛC) ≈
√
n/(pie)vol(ΛC)
1
2n . (12)
III. UNSHARED SECRET KEY CRYPTOSYSTEM WITH
FINITE CONSTELLATION INPUTS
In this section, we show that the idea of USK can be
applied to practical systems using finite constellation inputs.
We define the concept of secrecy outage and a secrecy outage
probability. We will later show how such probability can be
made arbitrarily small by considering larger constellation size
and jamming power.
A. Encryption
We consider a sequence of K mutually independent mes-
sages {mi}K1 , where each one contains n mutually indepen-
dent information bits. For each m, Alice maps the corre-
sponding n bits to NA elements of u for one channel use.
Each elements of u is uniformly selected from a finite lattice
constellation QNA , where ℜ(Q) = ℑ(Q) = {0, 1, ...,√M − 1}.
Consequently, we have
n = NA log2M . (13)
Let ui be the transmitted vector corresponding to message mi.
Across the K channel uses, we apply a sequence of secret
keys {vˆi}K1 to protect {ui}K1 . We consider secure transmis-
sions in a fast fading MIMO wiretap channel, i.e., all the
channels Hi, Gi, HˆJB,i, HˆJE,i are assumed to be mutually
independent and change independently for every channel use.
We assume that {vˆi}K1 and {ui}K1 are mutually independent.
Using (10), we only need to demonstrate the encryption
process for one transmitted vector ui, corresponding to a
message mi. We first interpret the signal model (6) as an
encryption algorithm:
yi = Giui + HˆJE,iZˆivˆi. (14)
y
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Fig. 1. The USK cryptosystem with finite constellations.
In detail, for the ith channel use, the jammers randomly and
independently (without any predefined distribution) choose a
OTP vˆi, from a ball of radius
√
PJ:
S , {vˆ ∈ CNJ−N ·NB : ||vˆ||2 ≤ PJ}, (15)
and encrypts ui to yi in (14) using vˆi, such that Giui is the
kthi closest lattice point to yi, within the finite lattice
ΛF,i , {Giu,u ∈ QNA}. (16)
The value of ki ranges from 1 to Li, where
Li = |SRmax,i ∩ ΛF,i|. (17)
and SRmax,i is a sphere centered at yi with radius:
Rmax,i(PJ) , max
||vˆi||
2≤PJ
∥∥∥HˆJE,iZˆivˆi∥∥∥ =√λmax,iPJ. (18)
where λmax,i is the largest eigenvalue of (HˆJE,iZˆi)H(HˆJE,iZˆi).
As shown in Fig. 1, the full and empty dots correspond to
the infinite lattice
ΛC,i , {Giu,u ∈ Z [i]NA}. (19)
The finite subset of ΛC,i, ΛF,i, is demonstrated by the full dots.
Consequently, Li represents the number of full dots within the
sphere SRmax,i .
The security problem lies in how much Eve knows about
ki. Since we assume that the realizations of Gi, HˆJE,i, Zˆi are
known to Eve, ki is a function of vˆi. Since vˆi is randomly
and independently selected by the jammers and is never shared
with anyone, Eve can neither know its realization nor its
distribution. Thus, given yi, Eve is not able to estimate the
distribution of the index ki, or more specifically, she only
knows that Giui ∈ SRmax,i ∩ ΛF,i.
Remark 4: The index ki can be interpreted as the effective
one-time pad secret key, whose randomness comes from vˆi.
The effective key space size is Li.
B. Analyzing Eve’s Equivocation
We then show that for each ui, Eve cannot obtain a unique
solution but Li indistinguishable candidates. The posterior
probability that Eve obtains ui, or equivalently, finds ki, from
the cryptogram yi, is
Pr
{
ui|yi
}
= Pr
{
ki|yi
}
= Pr
{
ui|ui ∈ Ui
}
, (20)
where
Ui =
{
u
′: Giu
′ ∈ SRmax,i ∩ ΛF,i
}
. (21)
Due to the use of uniform constellation QNA , according to
Bayes’ theorem, we have
Pr
{
ui|ui ∈ Ui
}
= 1/Li. (22)
To recover the message mi, Eve has to recover the vector
ui, or equivalently, find ki. Therefore, Eve’s equivocation is
given by
H(mi|yi) = H(ki|yi) = H(ui|yi). (23)
Moreover, since ui is independent of uj and yj , we have
H({ui}K1 | {yi}K1 ) =
K∑
i=1
H(ui|yi) =
K∑
i=1
logLi. (24)
Remark 5: From (11) and (24), ideal secrecy is achieved if
Li ≥ 2, for all i. (25)
C. Ideal Secrecy Outage
We then study how to satisfy the condition in (25). Note
that the values in {Li}K1 are known to Eve, but not Alice.
From Alice’s perspective, according to (17) and (21), Li is a
function of Gi HˆJE,i, Zˆi, vˆi, thus a random variable. Although
Alice cannot know the exact values in {Li}K1 , she may be able
to evaluate the joint probability Pr {L1 ≥ d, ..., LK ≥ d}, for
any 2 ≤ d ≤MNA .
We refer to the event
Li < d, (26)
as the ideal secrecy outage. We refer to the probability
Pout(d,K) = 1− Pr {L1 ≥ d, ..., LK ≥ d} , (27)
as the secrecy outage probability. From (25) and (27), if
Pout(d,K)→ 0, then
Li ≥ d, for all i. (28)
In the next section, we will show that Alice can ensure
Pout(d,K) → 0 by increasing the jamming power PJ and
constellation size M .
IV. THE SECURITY OF USK
In this section, we show that the USK with the finite
constellation QNA provides Shannon’s ideal secrecy with an
arbitrarily small outage.
A. A Useful Lemma
We define
Θ(PJ) ,
2Rmax(PJ)√
Mreff(ΛC)
, (29)
where ΛC is given in (19), reff(ΛC) is given in (12), and
Rmax(PJ) is given in (18).
From Alice’s perspective, Θ(PJ) is a function of G, HˆJE,i, Zˆi,
thus is a random variable. To prove the main theorem, we first
introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 1:
Pr {Θ(PJ) < x}
>
NA∏
j=1
B NENJ,
NE−j+1
(
NENJg(x, j)
NENJg(x, j) +NE − j + 1
)
, (30)
where
g(x, j) =
x2MNA(NE − j + 1)
4piePJNENJ(NJ −N ·NB) , (31)
and Ba,b(x) is the regularized incomplete beta function [15]:
Ba,b(x) ,
a+b−1∑
j=a
(
a+ b− 1
j
)
xj(1− x)a+b−1−j . (32)
Proof: See Appendix A.
B. Ideal Secrecy Outage Probability
An upper bound on Pout(d,K) in (27) can be derived using
Lemma 1.
Theorem 1: Given ε < 1, d ≥ 2, M ≥ ε−3−2/Nminκ(d)2,
and PJ = ε−2/Nminκ(d)2/Φ2NA/NE , then
Pout(d,K) < O(ε), (33)
where
Nmin , min {NE −NA + 1, NA} , (34)
κ(d) , d1/(2NE)/
√
pi, (35)
Φ ,
[
(NE −NA)!
NE!
] 1
2NA
, (36)
i.e., ideal secrecy is achieved with probability 1−O(ε).
Proof: See Appendix B.
Theorem 1 shows that for finite constellation QNA , the ideal
secrecy outage can be made arbitrarily small. Given a target
pair {ε, d}, we can easily compute the required values of PJ
and M to realize the USK cryptosystem.
Example 1: Fig. 2 examines the value of Pout(2, 1) as a
function of ε. We choose PJ and M according to
PJ = ε
−2/Nminκ(d)2/Φ2NA/NE and M ≥ ε−3−2/Nminκ(d)2.
We observe that Pout(2, 1) = 1.6× 10−4 when PJ = 3.5926 and
M = 256. This simulation confirms that the secrecy outage for
the finite constellation QNA can be made arbitrarily small by
increasing PJ and M .
Remark 6: Using the proof of Theorem 1, we can show
Pr {L1 = 1, ..., LK = 1} < O(εK). (37)
In order to enhance security, Alice can scramble the nK
message bits in {m′i}K1 by using an invertible binary nK×nK
matrix S to produce the sequence
{mi}K1 = {m′i}K1 S. (38)
Only with a probability of the order of εK given in (37) Eve
would be able to uniquely recover {m′i}K1 by inverting S.
In all other cases, occurring with probability εK′ , where Eve
recovers only K′ < K sub-blocks m′i, the system in (38) will
have 2n(K−K
′) different solutions. This enhances the overall
ambiguity of Eve’s when guessing the entire message {m′i}K1 .
10−0.710−0.610−0.510−0.410−0.3
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
ε
P
o
u
t
(2
,1
)
PJ =  1.7697, M = 16
PJ =  2.5346, M = 64
PJ =   3.5926, M = 256
PJ = 1.2674, M = 4
Fig. 2. Pout(2, 1) vs. ε with NA = NB = 2, NJ,1 = NJ,2 = 3, and
NE = 4.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we showed how to construct a practical
unshared secret key (USK) cryptosystem using finite con-
stellation inputs and some helpers. The new USK scheme
is specially designed for the scenario NE ≥ NA, where
the original USK scheme is not valid. We have shown that
Shannon’s ideal secrecy can be obtained with an arbitrarily
small outage probability, by simply increasing the constellation
size and jamming power. Our results provide new ideas for the
innovations and combinations of cryptography and physical
layer security. Future work will generalize USK to relaying
networks.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Recalling that
Rmax(PJ) = max
||vˆ||2≤PJ
∥∥∥HˆJEZˆvˆ∥∥∥ , (39)
reff(ΛC) =
√
NA/(pie)|det(GHG)|
1
2NA . (40)
From (18), applying Cauchy–Schwarz inequality,
R2max(PJ) ≤ PJ
∥∥∥HˆJEZ∥∥∥2
F
≤ PJ
∥∥∥HˆJE∥∥∥2
F
‖Z‖2F
= PJ(NJ −N ·NB)
∥∥∥HˆJE∥∥∥2
F
. (41)
From Alice perspective, HˆJE is a complex Gaussian random
matrix with i.i.d. components. Thus,
∥∥∥HˆJE∥∥∥2
F
can be expressed
in terms of a Chi-squared random variable:∥∥∥HˆJE∥∥∥2
F
=
1
2
X 2 (2NENJ) . (42)
According to [16], reff(ΛC) can be expressed in terms of NA
independent Chi-squared variables:
reff(ΛC) =
√
NA/(pie)

NA∏
j=1
1
2
X 2 (2(NE − j + 1))


1
2NA
. (43)
Moreover, since G, HˆJE, Zˆ are mutually independent,
Rmax(PJ) and reff(ΛC) are independent.
Then, we have
Pr
{
2Rmax(PJ)√
Mreff(ΛC)
< x
}
≥ Pr


PJ
∥∥∥HˆJE∥∥∥2
F
reff(ΛC)2
<
x2M
4(NJ −N ·NB)


(a)
≥ Pr


X 2 (2NENJ)
NA∑NA
j=1
1
X 2 (2(NE − j + 1))
<
x2MNA
4piePJ(NJ −N ·NB)


= Pr


NA∑
j=1
X 2 (2NENJ)
X 2 (2(NE − j + 1))
<
x2MN2A
4piePJ(NJ −N ·NB)


(b)
>
NA∏
j=1
Pr
{ X 2 (2NENJ)
X 2 (2(NE − j + 1)) ≤
x2MNA
4piePJ(NJ −N ·NB)
}
=
NA∏
j=1
Pr {F(2NENJ, 2(NE − j + 1)) ≤ g(x, j)} , (44)
where g(x, j) is given in (31), and F(k1, k2) represents an F-
distributed random variable with k1 and k2 degrees of freedom.
(a) holds due to the inequality of geometric and harmonic
means. (b) holds by induction on the fact that if the non-
negative random variables Ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , are mutually
independent, given a constant C > 0,
Pr
{
N∑
i=1
Ai < C
}
> Pr
{
A1 ≤ C/N ;
N∑
i=2
Ai ≤ C(N − 1)/N
}
= Pr {A1 ≤ C/N}Pr
{
N∑
i=2
Ai ≤ C(N − 1)/N
}
. (45)
Since the cdf of F(k1, k2) can be expressed using the
regularized incomplete beta function [15], the final expression
of (44) is given in (30).

B. Proof of Theorem 1
From Alice’s perspective, Li is a function of Gi, HˆJE,i, , Zˆi,
and vˆi. Since {Gi}K1 ,
{
HˆJE,i
}K
1
,
{
Zˆi
}K
1
, {vˆi}K1 are mutually
independent, {Li}K1 are mutually independent. From (27),
Pout(d,K) = 1−
K∏
i=1
Pr {Li ≥ d} . (46)
We then evaluate Pr {Li < d}. For simplicity, we remove
the index i. We define
D = |SRmax ∩ ΛC|. (47)
According to [7, Th. 2], with PJ = ε−2/Nminκ(d)2/Φ2NA/NE ,
the jammers can ensure
Pr(D < d) < O(ε), (48)
where Nmin is given in (34), κ(d) is given in (35), and Φ is
given in (36). We can upper bound Pr {L < d} by
Pr {L < d} = Pr{L < d|D ≥ d}Pr{D ≥ d}
+ Pr{L < d|D < d}Pr{D < d}
≤ Pr {L < D|D ≥ d}Pr{D ≥ d}+O(ε)
≤ Pr {L < D}+O(ε). (49)
We then evaluate Pr {L < D}.
Pr {L < D} = Pr{L < D|Θ(PJ) < ε}Pr{Θ(PJ) < ε}
+ Pr{L < D|Θ(PJ) ≥ ε}Pr{Θ(PJ) ≥ ε}
≤ Pr{L < D|Θ(PJ) < ε}+ Pr{Θ(PJ) ≥ ε}, (50)
where Θ(PJ) is given in (29).
We then evaluate the two terms in (50), separately.
1) Pr {L < D|Θ(PJ) < ε}: Recalling that
y = Gu+HˆJEZˆvˆ and ΛF = {Gu,u ∈ QNA}. (51)
Since L = |SRmax∩ΛF|, we begin by checking the boundary
of ΛF. Let O be the center point of ΛF. According to [17], for
the Gaussian random lattice basis G, the boundary of ΛF can
be approximated by a sphere SF,S centered at O with radius√
Mreff(ΛC), where reff(ΛC) is given in (12).
Given Θ(PJ) < ε and ε < 1, we have
√
Mreff(ΛC) >
2Rmax(PJ). We define a concentric sphere SF,C with radius√
Mreff(ΛC) − 2Rmax(PJ), where Rmax(PJ) is given in (18).
We then check when L = D given Θ(PJ) < ε.
If Gu ∈ SF,C, using triangle inequality, we have
||y −O|| ≤ ‖Gu−O‖+
∥∥∥HˆJEZˆvˆ∥∥∥ ≤ √Mreff(ΛC)−Rmax(PJ)
(52)
We then check the locations of the D elements in SRmax ∩ΛC
(47), denoted by, Gu′t, 1 ≤ t ≤ D. Note that∥∥Gu′t − y∥∥ ≤ Rmax(PJ). (53)
From (52) and (53), using triangle inequality, for all t,∥∥Gu′t −O∥∥ ≤ ‖y −O‖+ ∥∥Gu′t − y∥∥ ≤ √Mreff(ΛC). (54)
Therefore, SRmax ∩ ΛC ⊂ ΛF, i.e., L = D.
If GV1u /∈ SF,C, there is a probability that L < D.
Therefore, we have
Pr {L < D|Θ(PJ) < ε} < Pr {Gu /∈ SF,C} . (55)
Since Gu is uniformly distributed over SF,S, we have
Pr {Gu ∈ SF,C} =
vol(SF,C)
vol(SF,S)
= (1−Θ(PJ))2NA > (1− ε)2NA
(56)
Based on (55) and (56), we have
Pr {L < D|Θ(PJ) < ε} < 1− (1− ε)2NA = O(ε). (57)
2) Pr{Θ(PJ) ≥ ε}: Using Lemma 1 with M ≥
ε−3−2/Nminκ(d)2, we have
Pr {Θ(PJ) < ε} ≥
NA∏
j=1
Ba,b(j)
(
1− b(j)
ag(ε, j) + b(j)
)
(a)
=
NA∏
j=1
1−Bb(j),a
(
b(j)
ag(ε, j) + b(j)
)
(b)
=
NA∏
j=1
(
1−O(εb(j))
)
> (1−O(εNˆ ))NA , (58)
where Nˆ = NE −NA + 1 and
a = NENJ and b(j) = NE − j + 1. (59)
(a) and (b) hold due to the facts that
Ba,b(j)(x) = 1−Bb(j),a(1− x), (60)
Bb(j),a(x) = O(x
b(j)), for x→ 0. (61)
Consequently, we have
Pr{Θ(PJ) ≥ ε} < 1−
(
1−O(εNˆ )
)NA
= O(εNˆ ). (62)
By substituting (50), (57) and (62) to (49), we have
Pr {L < d} < O(ε). (63)
From (46) and (63), if M ≥ ε−3−2/Nminκ(d)2 and PJ =
ε−2/Nminκ(d)2/Φ2NA/NE , we have
Pout(d,K) < 1− (1−O(ε))K = O(ε). (64)

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